War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Without contributing to derail, anyone who wants to read up on it can get the free PDF https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-answers-to-your-questions-print-fr.html

It gives pretty plain english (and many other languages!), education that troops and staffs can understand without being lawyers or specialists.

# ¿ Oct 13, 2022 01:33

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# ¿ May 12, 2024 18:20

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Intro and excerpts as I decide etc blah.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3189340/senior-military-official-holds-a-background-briefing-on-ukraine/

Highlights/Other:
Other
-There was a separate brief with the Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary, and she was asked every which way what the deal is with SpaceX and demands for payments, and all she could really say was that the DOD is talking to SpaceX regarding Starlink. About something. For some reason. And that Starlink service in Ukraine has been funded by some private people at least in part. And maybe the US government, but didn't know for sure. And that she hadn't seen all of Elon Musk's tweets. It was weird and can be read here if you like https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3189495/sabrina-singh-deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-holds-a-press-briefing/
Latest PDA: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3189571/725-million-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/

SMO:
-Russia's use of precision-guided munitionis (PGMs) has been indiscriminate and imprecise. "Most" of the recent strikes struck civilians and/or civilian infrastructure. Some of this is the result of indiscriminate targeting. Other times Russia appears deliberately to target civilians, with the specific examples given of electricity, bridges, etc.
-Kharkiv: Lines are mostly static, and Russia is digging in. Not zero movement but "really limited in terms of movement this week."
-Bakhmut: Russia has made "very small" gains around Bakhmut. Sometimes Ukraine counterattacks and retakes land. "All of those attacks on both sides are coming with pretty high impact in terms of the employment of artillery and the losses to the sides who are making those advances."
-Zaporizhzhia: No real movement of the line. "We have seen artillery that's landed in and around the Zaporizhzhia area, but nothing that's caused us a great concern over the week. "
-Kherson: Ukraine has gained from the north toward Kherson. Not a lot of advancement but "some" on the central approach to Kherson. Russia has established new lines in Kherson defense since this started six weeks ago, but will need to make a decision on how/'where to defend along the Kherson axis. Neither side really making a move at the edge of Kherson city itself.
-Of ~80 missiles fired by Russia in the first 24 hours of retaliation over Kerch strait bridge [My note: SMO did not confirm that Ukraine attacked Kerch Strait bridge, though refers to Russia retaliation in response to bridge attack], roughly half reported intercepted. Ukraine likely firing more than one SAM in many of those defensive engagements, which is part of why Ukraine requires air defense support.
-SMO does not comment on whether or not the Ukrainian assessment of Russia's remaining stock of PGMs is accurate. Says it is telling that Russia is now relying on Iranian one-way attack UAS.
-SMO on Starlink: It is very useful to be able to communicate. Did not want to address questions on Musk and his recent comments
-The press had a lot of questions about air defense, but the SMO today wasn't terribly knowledgeable on air defense specifics and wasn't sharing what are probably still ongoing somewhat sensitive discussions of who can/will/might provide what and when

quote:

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thanks, (inaudible). Hi, everybody. How are you? This is -- this is different for me, so I'll get to see you all roll your eyes when I -- when I give you the answer that you may not want, as opposed to just doing it on the phone.

So this is the 233rd day of Russia's illegal, unprovoked large-scale invasion of Ukraine, and a lot of activity this week, as you all know, overseas in Europe in terms of folks who have gathered, and a number of press engagements. So quite honestly, other than maybe some atmospherics on the ground, I'm probably not going to give you a great amount of things that will be helpful, right? I hate to say that up front, but I'll certainly talk to what I can talk to.

We do assess that the Ukrainians continue to make some advances on the battlefield, and I'm very happy to talk about what we're seeing in that regard. We also have seen, as you know, particularly since the attack at the Kerch Strait Bridge last week, we've seen the Russians continue to retaliate. The use of precision-guided munitions in a very imprecise way has continued over the course of the week. I think it's fair to say we're in the hundreds in terms of the number of missiles that the Russians have launched against Ukrainian targets, and in many -- in most, I would tell you, cases, they have been used at civilian targets either indiscriminately or certainly in a deliberate way, as it relates to infrastructure targets like electricity or bridges or otherwise. And as you've heard others other than me talk about, certainly, in violation of what the international rules of war stand for.

Around the battlefield, so just working kind of north to south, in Kharkiv, we've seen limited Ukrainian gains over the course of the week. We have seen the Russians continue to strengthen their defenses in the Kharkiv area, and so it's at a stop, is probably the wrong term. There are some very minor incremental gains, really, all the way from the northern portion of the Kharkiv area of operation down towards Lyman, but really limited in terms of movement this week.

In Bakhmut it's similar, but the other way. So we've seen -- so now moving down to -- the center portion of the eastern front there around Bakhmut, we've seen the Russians continue to work to attack the Ukrainians around Bakhmut. Those gains have also been very small for the Russians, and in times we've seen the Ukrainians counterattack with effectiveness to retake land that the Russians had previously taken. All of those attacks on both sides are coming with pretty high impact in terms of the employment of artillery and the losses to the sides who are making those advances.

Nothing really new in Zaporizhzhia in terms of advances. You know, like you all, we continue to watch Zaporizhzhia with added care, just given the nuclear power plant. We have seen artillery that's landed in and around the Zaporizhzhia area, but nothing that's caused us a great concern over the week.

And then in Kherson, probably more movement in Kherson than anywhere else on the battlespace. And so Kherson, if you describe it, has three different axes in the Kherson area of operation: the north, the central and the south. We've seen them continue to advance in the north, and so we have seen gains in the north now. Really, the line of advance for the Ukrainians just north of the city of Milove, or Milove, -- however you'd like to pronounce it, all of them probably incorrect.

And then extending, essentially, to the north and west with a number of small towns and villages that the Ukrainians have been able to clear of the Russians, and the Russians have moved back from what was their front lines as they reestablish front lines after the beginning of this six weeks ago, and are establishing defenses further south. So the Ukrainians now continue to advance on that northern axis, but at the same time, we've seen incremental gains in that central axis. So not a lot of advancement, but some. So we're talking kilometers as they move. And what you're seeing, if you'd put that on a map and there are a number of good ones out there -- but if you look at that on a map, you're getting these two coinciding axes that are starting to force the Russians to make some decisions in terms of how they want to choose to defend.

It's also placed a good portion of that battlespace under artillery range of standard artillery, not GMLRS. And so you've seen them employ fewer GMLRS recently because they just don't need to. They can range the Russian targets they want to hit with standard artillery.

And then outside Kherson city itself, not a huge number of movements outside of Kherson city in terms of the Ukrainians, but certainly, not any Russian gains in that portion of the battlespace.

In the maritime environment, so about a half-dozen ships that are underway for the Russians. That does include Kalibr-capable ships. I'll say about half of those that are Kalibr-capable. We did get indications yesterday of some Kalibr missiles being fired from the sea, and our understanding is that they were all intercepted by the Ukrainian air defenses. And then we continue to train.

I'll hold there. I'm happy to talk about what I know anything about, and so I'll pass it back to (inaudible).

...

Q: Hi, thank you very much for doing this. As you mentioned, the Russian -- the distance between the two forces is closing in right now in this part of the battle. Does that change the Ukrainians' immediate needs? Instead of having a longer range rocket or missile, are there other things you're looking at that might be more advantageous for this particular phase?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am. It's a good question, and certainly a lot of conversation in the past week about what the Ukrainians would need for the longer term. I think the biggest piece -- and it was discussed in great detail last week -- or this week in Europe has been air defense.

You know, if you look at -- and I'll just give you a 24 hour period. In that first period of retaliation, 80-plus missiles that were fired at the Ukrainians at all sorts of different targets -- and roughly 40 of those, so 50 percent-ish, were intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses.

What I don't know is how many missiles are fired at one inbound missile. And so you can assume it's more than one, in a lot of cases. And so just every time, you know, they employ one, it -- it certainly increases the need to replace that.

You know, that's one thing that -- you know, if you look at the Russians and their conduct of this fight, what's different in the conduct of this fight that is different, say, in some of the events that we've fought in over the past -- go back a long way -- is the ability to establish air superiority.

The Russians have never been able to do that, and that changes the character of -- of the fight on the ground. We have always, up to this point, been able to do that and that -- that changes. And I'd just tell you, having been in a bunch of them, the fact that you don't have to be concerned with something above you in large measure changes the fight. And so the Russians have never been able to get that.

The conversation this week about the criticality of air defense goes straight to that, I believe.

Q: (Inaudible) average of -- of roughly -- the 80 missiles that were fired, do you have a sense of what types of missiles the Russians are firing?

And there's been a lot of chatter about the Russian stockpiles are dwindling. Is that what you're seeing, based on what they're firing at these targets?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: I think -- I haven't seen this but I was told that the Ukrainians released some views as to what they believe the munitions totals are for the Russians. I don't know what those are, quite honestly, but I do know that the numbers of precision missiles that the Russians have fired since the beginning of the fight are pretty extensive, and I think the fact that they're now going to the Iranians to use drones speaks to their concern associated with precision munitions.

So every one of them fired is probably a very careful consideration for the Russians. If you look at -- and I'm not an economics expert certainly -- but if you look at the sanctions, you have to believe that the sanctions are having an impact on their defense industrial base and the ability to regenerate, in particular, those precision munitions, so.

...

Q: (Inaudible), you -- a couple of days ago mentioned the need for an integrated air defense system. At the Joint Staff level, what are you doing? What would the -- what would an integrated air defense system look like in three weeks that you don't have now, or three months? And what will the NASAMS system give the Ukrainians by way of capability that they do not now possess, once it's delivered?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: So on the last one, sir -- and I'm not an expert on NASAMS, other than some of the ranges in particular -- but I think it -- it adds to their ability to kind of layer their defenses. And so if you look at some of the higher end systems they have, they're able to detect targets further out, to choose the type of munitions that they want to use against various targets, depending on how far out they can -- they can pick it up.

A great example would be if I can determine that something is a helicopter vice an airplane or a cruise missile, I then can choose the type of munition to employ against it with better effectiveness. So using, as an example -- and I'll use an example from somewhere else -- if I was to take a quadcopter and shoot a quadcopter down with a Patriot missile, that's a pretty bad choice. And so in a different way, they're able to generally choose to do the same things.

Now, the integrated air and missile defense system allows them greater ability to do that. So if they can determine you know, we generally know where an opponent flies. They can -- if they can integrate all of their different layers of air defense, then it allows them to make those kinds of decisions.

I don't know if I described that very well or not.

Q: -- integrated air defense system now with the capabilities they have in their country (inaudible) what's been provided today?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: You know, sir, just watching what they're doing, it's hard to believe that it's nascent. I mean, I think they clearly understand and have understood the criticality of air defenses for a while. If they didn't, I think we would go back to that air superiority conversation and you'd see the Russians have a much greater opportunity to interdict what they're doing with air power.

# ¿ Oct 15, 2022 04:00

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Ynglaur posted:

The planes were an issue because they have almost no radar signature, not enough of a heat signature for heat-seeking missiles to work, and fly slowly enough that apparently it would be tricky for a modern jet to use its gun on them. Doable, still, but difficult, and enough of them would get through it would be a problem.

AN-2�s have an astonishingly large radar signature and run hot as the sun. They are slow and can fly quite low, that part is true.

It�s a total myth. Giant airplanes cannot be invisible with one weird trick like wooden wing spars.

E: While I�m here every single C-RAM engagement costs a few thousand dollars in ammo, not counting the equipment, fuel, and troops.

# ¿ Oct 18, 2022 03:05

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

They might go unnoticed if low and slow just like a huge honking helicopter might, but there�s nothing inherently sneaky about an AN-2. I can see being worried they could be used in a similar role as a Chinook, just slow vs vertical takeoff/landing.

# ¿ Oct 18, 2022 03:12

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

WarpedLichen posted:

I don't think anybody is asking them to say anything at all, so there's no reason a statement had to be made in the first place.

What do you mean by this?

# ¿ Oct 24, 2022 23:40

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

WarpedLichen posted:

Is Biden asking the progressive caucus for opinions on what to do during the war?

Congress members often speak or write without being directed to by the president.

# ¿ Oct 24, 2022 23:59

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Kraftwerk posted:

Do we have any updates on the strategic situation in the war? It seems we've been under blackout for a few days?

Sure.

Intro and then excerpts as I pick. I cut down on excerpts a lot this time around, because people asked the same couple questions over and over or asking for details on how the IC came to this assessment regarding dirty bombs and nuclear weapons.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3197746/senior-military-official-holds-a-background-briefing/

-Ukraine is not building dirty bombs and the whole dirty bomb story is bullshit
-No indication that Russia is planning to use nuclear weapons or " the kinds of capabilities that I have mentioned." when discussing nuclear weapons and dirty bombs, chemical weapons, biological weapons, etc.
-Bakhmut remains dynamic, with Ukraine defending against Russian attacks [My Note: There has been a lot of small scale back and forth as Russia has struggled to try to take Bakhmut for the past 8-11 weeks or so and has managed to get the line up to the eastern edge of the city]
-Russian forces are digging in and fortifying defensive lines with troops, trenches, etc vicinity of Kherson City and surrounding area. DOD continuing to refer to Kherson axis as Ukraine being "deliberate and calibrated" in offense.
-DOD has not paid SpaceX for Starlink service in Ukraine.

quote:

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: All right, well, good morning, everyone. Thank you very much for joining us. (inaudible) here. I will be your briefer today. As a reminder, today's briefing will be on background. You may attribute it to "a senior military official." A few items to cover up top, and then I'll provide an overview of the battlefield in Ukraine.

So as you're aware, Secretary Austin spoke to Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu on Friday and on Sunday. Friday's call was initiated by Secretary Austin, whereas Sunday's call was requested by Minister Shoigu as a follow-up to Friday's discussion. And I'm not going to have any more details to provide regarding these calls beyond what was in the readouts that we published on defense.gov, and I appreciate your understanding on that front.

He also spoke to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense on Friday; has another call scheduled for later today. We'll be sure to provide a readout on that. And you can expect to see -- see a series of phone calls with allies and partners in the days ahead as well, and again, we'll be sure to provide readouts as they become available.

Separate, but related, we've seen the reports of Russian allegations that Ukraine is preparing to use a dirty bomb in Ukraine. These allegations are false, and as my NSC colleagues have said, the world would see through any attempt to use this allegation as a pretext for escalation. Notably, however, while I'm not going to discuss specific intelligence, we still have seen nothing to indicate that the Russians have made a decision to employ nuclear weapons. We'll, of course, continue to monitor it closely and keep the lines of communication open between allies, partners, the Ukrainians and the Russians.

In the meantime, our focus remains on continuing to work with the international community to provide Ukraine with the security assistance and support they need to defend their country.

Turning to the situation on the ground in Ukraine, we continue to see Russian strikes across Ukraine with many appearing to target Ukraine's power grid. These strikes have employed various missiles and drones, to include Iranian-provided UAVs. In the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their lines in support of their counteroffensive, with both sides trading artillery fire. We do assess that the Ukrainians have liberated some villages in the region and continue to make advances as they pressure toward the east. Russian forces in this area are largely focused on reinforcing their defensive lines.

Near Bakhmut fighting remains heavy and dynamic, with Russian forces attempting to take the city but being contested by Ukrainian forces. And in the Kherson region, Ukrainian forces continue to make deliberate and calibrated operations in support of their counteroffensive along three main axes. We assess that Russian forces are largely digging in to strengthen their defensive lines in this sector.

...

Q: Good morning. Thanks for doing this.

I wanted to talk about the Shoigu/Austin call. As you're likely aware, Shoigu has also said that the -- he's also spoken again this morning to the U.K. defense minister. I'm wondering if there's another scheduled call for Austin and Shoigu. And with the, I guess, increased number of these calls, how concerned is the Pentagon that this is all being used for a pretext for attack?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, so I don't have anything to announce right now in terms of potential future calls. As always, Secretary Austin believes that it's important to have mechanisms in place for engaging both allies and adversaries alike to address and work through potential misperceptions in order to manage escalation and prevent miscalculation.

In terms of your second question, I'm not going to speculate. Again, the Ukrainians are not building a dirty bomb, but we also have no indications that the Russians have made a decision to employ nuclear weapons. So we'll continue to monitor it closely. We'll keep the lines of communication open with allies, partners, the Ukrainians and the Russians, and as I mentioned at the top, our focus will continue to be on working with our allies, partners and the Ukrainians to provide the Ukrainians with the support that they need to defend their country.

...

All right, let me go to Tom Bowman, NPR.

Q: Yeah, again on Kherson, there's reports that some Russian troops are leaving, crossing the Dnipro, others are coming in. Can you give us a sense of what you're seeing, a ballpark on numbers? And are they crossing over a single bridge, a barge? How's that working out?

And also, you know, this great need for generators in Ukraine because of the Russian attacks on the power infrastructure, is there a sense that the U.S. and NATO will send more generators in?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks, Tom.

So in terms of Russian movements in Kherson, we do have indications that some Russian units are essentially relocating, you know, in terms of the -- and repositioning -- but in terms of the numbers and specifically how they're doing that, I'm not going to get into that level of detail.

Largely speaking, though, the Russian forces that are in the vicinity of Kherson City and throughout that sector, we see them looking to shore up their defensive lines, you know, essentially to -- to counter the -- the Russian -- or the Ukrainian, rather, counter-offensive.

So as far as generators go, I don't -- I don't have anything to provide on that, other than to say, you know, broadly speaking, when it comes to support for Ukraine, I think you've seen the U.S. allies, partners working to stay in close communication with the Ukrainians, in terms of what their needs are, particularly going into the winter.

So I don't have anything to announce today but certainly I expect that it will be a continued area of conversation, how best we can support Ukraine heading into the -- the --

Q: -- right. And you say "shoring up defenses." Can you get a little more specific? Are they digging trenches, hardening locations? What exactly does "shoring up" look like?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, I think you're exactly right. In some cases, digging trenches, setting up defenses (in depth ?), in terms of being able to defend against Ukrainian counter-offensive. So that's about the level of detail that I'm able to go into right now.

...

Q: Thanks so much.

You just had a question on Russian corruption. I'm curious if the Pentagon has any assessment or the U.S. has an assessment of what impact corruption in the Russian defense industry has had on the overall effectiveness of Russia's war effort?

Thanks.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks for the question, Jack.

So I -- I'm not -- I don't really have any information specifically to provide in terms of corruption writ large within the Russian defense industry.

I will say, in terms of Russian performance on the battlefield, you know, we have seen a significant challenge when it comes to logistics, sustainment, not only on the battlefield but also as you've seen from their mobilization.

So while I don't have any specifics to provide in terms of how the Russian MOD manages its resources, what we are seeing is the inability to sustain large scale combat operations in the Ukraine and to train, equip and then get these mobilized forces to the battlefield.

And so, in some ways, that speaks for itself but I'd refer you to the Russian MOD to talk about their own management.

...

Q: Hey, thanks.

So just so I am clear on this when you say that the U.S. is seeing no information to indicate that the Russians have made a decision to employ nuclear weapons, are you including employing dirty bombs. Are you lumping that in when you say nuclear weapons? That's question number one.

And then question number two, have the NASAMS arrived in Ukraine yet?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: We�ve seen no information to indicate that they [Russia] have made a decision to employ nuclear/chem/bio weapons on the battlefield.

Q: To include dirty bombs?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q: Okay, great. And then about the NASAMS that the U.S. are provided to the Ukrainians, have they arrived in country yet?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: So we expect the NASAMS to be delivered within the next couple of weeks. Of course, we'll defer to our Ukrainian partners to make that announcement when they arrived and when they're operational. But as we've mentioned before, we'll continue to work hard to get those there as quickly as possible.

...

Q: Thank you.

You have said repeatedly the U.S. has no indications that the Russians are planning to use nuclear weapons. What about the possibility that the Russians are planning to stage a false-flag attack using a radiological weapon, and then blaming it on Ukraine? Are you seeing any indications of that?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks for the question, Jeff.

So again, I'm not going to speculate. Right now, I'll provide the facts as I know them, which are that the Ukrainians are not building a dirty bomb, nor do we have indications that the Russians have made a decision to employ nuclear/chem/bio, you know. So again, we'll monitor this closely, as I've mentioned. We'll keep the lines of communication open. But again, from a Department of Defense standpoint, our focus right now is going to be on continuing to support Ukraine in their fight.

...

Q: Yes, the Russian MOD has said that they've activated their counter-WMD forces, or put them on alert, and I'm just wondering, what is your assessment of what you've seen Russian forces doing to prepare for their -- as alleging the use of a dirty bomb?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, so I'd have to refer you to the Russian MOD to talk about their specific forces. Again, our focus right now has been on supporting Ukraine. But I don't have anything specific to provide in regards to Russian MOD forces.

...

Q: Thanks for taking my question.

Can you answer -- has the Pentagon funded SpaceX's Starlink system at all yet?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: So at this time, the DOD has not paid SpaceX for any Starlink services, as it relates to Ukraine. Again, we continue to have conversations with SpaceX and others in terms of how best to support Ukraine for their satellite communication needs.

...

Q: Okay, thank you.

And just separately, does the U.S. have -- has the U.S. seen any indications that there's more Iranian drones on the way to Ukraine? I just saw Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia asked for 2,000 more.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: So, you know, as I highlighted in the beginning, we do know that Iran has provided Russia with drones for use on the battlefield in Ukraine. While I don't have anything specific to provide in terms of potential future deliveries, it would not -- we would not be surprised were that the case. So that's something we'll continue to keep an eye on going forward.

# ¿ Oct 25, 2022 00:56

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Why is �mobik� a term and who coined the term?

# ¿ Nov 9, 2022 01:30

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

KitConstantine posted:

I would guess it's a portmanteau of "mobilized" and "vatnik" but I don't know the actual origin

Hate it

# ¿ Nov 9, 2022 01:36

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Also note: When the US says it is low on munitions, it means it�s low given baseline stores and requirements to support several contingency plans.

So you could have thousands of a special munition and still say you don�t have enough to spare any.

# ¿ Nov 15, 2022 15:04

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

https://twitter.com/seungminkim/status/1592745092112347136?s=46&t=ARysUQm7zmqgkw8ShtUJEg

# ¿ Nov 16, 2022 06:16

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Brain65 posted:

There's a non-zero possibility that the rocket 'found' something with a heat signature on ground and hit it. I'd put this at a very low probability but it's still there. It predicates on the missile being the right variant and in the right phase of flight. Think old-Macdonald having the only tractor slightly running hot kilometers away from anything else.

S-300s do not track heat or have any kind of IR sensor.

There have been now thousands of Russian missiles fired and hundreds to thousands of interceptors fired. This is not the first object to land outside Ukraine, just the first one to happen to hit a populated area.

# ¿ Nov 16, 2022 14:40

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Brain65 posted:

. The fact that NATO as a whole seems to want to de-escalate and Ukraine wants to save face for yelling for 12 hours 'the Russians did it' doesn't help identify who fired the missile.

Do you suspect the Russian Navy fired a missile into Poland and NATO governments are lying to cover it up?

# ¿ Nov 16, 2022 15:08

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Brain65 posted:

Not at all; personally I think Ukraine fired some S300 to intercept something

Same.

# ¿ Nov 16, 2022 15:48

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Herstory Begins Now posted:

What part of that are you disputing

Never seen training that says if one guy starts a fight, shoot everyone on the site. Hard to tell what all transpired, but that�s a point where this twitter dude either came from a very weird unit with bad training or is just bullshitting.

# ¿ Nov 19, 2022 04:14

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Crosby B. Alfred posted:

Wouldn't it be better to target actual military infrastructure or choke points like major freeways or bridges? Or save them for actual combat?

If you're talking about the Iranian-made drones, no. They are largely waypoint programmable and have a warhead that can knock out very fragile infrastructure or point targets, but would be a complete waste vs roads and bridges. So using them against any kind of hardened road or moving/mobile target is kind of pointless. The Russians have been using Lancet drones to target actual mobile combat units and personnel.

# ¿ Nov 24, 2022 17:40

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Quixzlizx posted:

I think it would be even more effective to only shoot missiles with actual warheads on them because you have no need of rationing them.

The VKS and Russia�s long range fires have been poorly used and targeted, but aerial decoys are a common thing used by the most modern militaries.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM-141_TALD

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM-160_MALD

https://www.elbitsystems-uk.com/what-we-do/air-space/self-protection/counter-measures/atald.pdf

# ¿ Nov 26, 2022 16:53

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Rigel posted:

To make a silly fantasy wargame analogy, this is like running out of boulders for your catapults, and having your... I dunno.... say ogres, pick up the catapults and throw them at the other side. That might cause a lot of damage, but then what?

I think this analogy only works if Russia flies its bombers devoid of weapons over Ukraine and then they get shot down. So no�

# ¿ Nov 26, 2022 17:13

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Quixzlizx posted:

I'm guessing most militaries don't "decommision" nuclear cruise missiles and re-employ them as decoy missiles.

Not really. The US has done so to create target/test missiles and aircraft before, but not for use over other nations.

notwithoutmyanus posted:

Humor aside, I guess munitions are running low? I mean excusing using critical missiles for kinetic energy opens a lot of "why?" questions even now.

AS-15s aren't really critical... Maybe they're available and make an OK decoy? But the AS-15 is obsolete as a part of Russia's nuclear triad.

# ¿ Nov 27, 2022 04:22

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Haven't done one of these in a while, because they haven't been terribly interesting/informative lately as combat has slowed down or press briefings occurred days after other media sources covered the same topics.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...round-briefing/

Intro, then questions as I choose.

Highlights:
-Russia switching to aerial attacks on infrastructure, especially civil power grid
-Heavy fighting in Kharkiv along P-66 highway
-Heavy fighting in Bakhmut
-NASAMS performance reportedly good so far (note that this means good where they can range, obviously there are areas beyond NASAMS' coverage)
-No more info regarding Iran and ballistic missiles and weapon supplies
-Russian artillery advantage still exists, but the ratio to which the Russians could outshoot the Ukrainian forces has decreased significantly over time
-Tactical Aircraft (jets) are not off the table, but they are not an immediate need given the nature of the fighting, and the maintenance/training challenge remains high, so it's still a thing in planning for the future, a ways out
-US had "a decent indication that there was a possibility [the missile that landed in Poland] was a Ukrainian-fired air defense system not meant to go into Poland."

quote:

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Good morning. This morning, I'd like to focus my initial remarks on the department's recent -- most recent security assistance package for Ukraine, which we actually released just before the Thanksgiving holiday, on November 23rd.

But before I get into those specifics, I want to offer a bit of context that could help in understanding the urgency and importance of these capabilities that we're providing to Ukraine.

As we see Russian forces struggling on the ground in recent weeks, we have also seen Russia increasingly turning to airstrikes to damage Ukraine's energy grid infrastructure. These are horrific attacks to punish the Ukrainian people as winter approaches. They serve no legitimate military purpose.

The attacks also show Russia's willingness to increase the risk of a nuclear safety incident, which could have harmful consequences not only in Ukraine but across the wider region as well. Russia has shown no sign of relenting in its attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. And as we have described previously, Iran is providing Russia with an alternative source of weapons as Russia's own supplies diminish.

In this context, air defense capabilities remain an urgent priority for the United States and for our partners, in support of Ukraine. As part of the 25th presidential drawdown package announced earlier this month, we committed missiles for Hawk air defense systems as well as Avenger air defense systems and associated Stinger missiles.

Hawk is a mobile, medium range air defense capability to deny Russian aircraft and missiles flying at high altitudes. The missiles will compliment Spain's recent commitment of Hawk launchers. Avenger is a mobile, short-range air defense system that will improve Ukraine's ability to protect Ukrainian troops and critical infrastructure against unmanned aerial systems and helicopters.

Our allies and partners have stepped up in this area too. Secretary Austin highlighted some of the most recent contributions at the last Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on November 16th. Sweden announced its largest assistance package yet, which included air defense systems. Spain promised to send two more Hawk launchers and missiles. And Poland has committed short-range air defense capabilities. And a number of allies and partners have committed advanced medium range air-to-air, or what we call AMRAAM, missiles for the NASAMS air defense system that the U.S. has provided.

And that brings me to Wednesday's announcement of our 26th drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories. This package also includes additional AMRAAM missiles for NASAMS. Two of these systems are now operational in Ukraine and we have committed six more.

As the Secretary has noted, their performance so far in intercepting Russian missiles has been very impressive. Presidential drawdown package 26 also includes 150 heavy machine guns with thermal imagery sights to help counter unmanned aerial systems.

Now, beyond air defense, this latest package includes a range of other important capabilities, including additional ammunition for HIMARS, 200 precision-guided 155 millimeter artillery rounds, 10,000 120 millimeter mortar rounds, HARM, or High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles, 150 Humvees, and over 100 light tactical vehicles, 20 million rounds of small arms ammunition, as well as spare parts, as we always provide, in this case, for 155 millimeter howitzers as well as other equipment.

Now, with temperatures dropping in Ukraine, it will be a challenging winter but we expect that Ukrainian forces will continue fighting. In anticipation, our latest package includes over 200 generators for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and this is on top of the winter equipment in our previous package, presidential drawdown package 25, which included tents, heaters, and several thousand pieces of cold weather gear.

So now, in total, the United States has committed more than $19 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia's invasion on February 24th. We will continue to consult closely with Ukraine and coordinate with our allies and partners to provide Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Thank you. And over to (inaudible).

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hi, everybody. Good morning. Good to be back with you after a little hiatus. I'll just give you a quick rundown of what we're seeing on the battlefield here on the 279th day of -- of fighting in Russia's illegal and unprovoked large scale invasion of Ukraine. And I'll -- let me walk you from north to south and then I'll save the balance of the time for questions and conversation.

So in the north, near Kharkiv, still pretty heavy fighting. That line, I want to say it's the P-66 highway, which runs from Svatove down to Kreminna. The -- largely has become the front line trace of both Ukrainian and Russian forces.

We see Russian forces building pretty significant defensive positions in that portion of the battle space, and then as you move further south towards Lysychansk and then continue to move further south towards Bakhmut, those lines have not changed dramatically but the exchange of fighting -- in terms of artillery -- is pretty significant.

As you get into Bakhmut, in particular -- so now continuing further south in and around Bakhmut, that fighting has been very intense. And we have seen over the past several days, in fact, positions that have changed on both sides. So Ukrainian offensive around Bakhmut, which gained some ground against the Russians, and then a Russian counter-offensive which took that ground back.

And again, we've seen this back and forth now for weeks between the Russians and the Ukrainians in the vicinity of Bakhmut and really in the Donetsk Oblast there, as you head south, and then proceed towards Zaporizhzhia.

So Zaporizhzhia -- no significant fighting in and around Zaporizhzhia. I know there was conversation about the Russians supporting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We don't have anything in particular on that. Certainly, if that nuclear power plant was handed over responsibly, that'd be a great thing, but no indications of any concern with the nuclear power plant.

And then down to Kherson, you know, since I was on this last, you've seen the Russians move to the east side of the Dnieper River. Although the Ukrainians now own all the ground on the west side of the river, there are significant de-mining operations that are occurring by Ukrainian forces, and the Russians continue to shell to the west side of the river as well. But certainly great gains there in Kherson as the Ukrainians press to the river over the past month.

In terms of the maritime domain, we estimate around three ships that are underway in the Black Sea, including Kalibr-capable ships. Not a lot of air operations from the Russian side. You know, weather has been pretty limiting, I think, in terms of operations on both sides in the air, and we've seen a reduction in air sorties overall. We continue to train the Ukrainians in a number of ways, as do our partners.

...

Q: Hi. Thanks for doing this.

On the latest tranche of military aid, has that already gotten into Ukraine? Can you say if the generators have already gotten in? And are there plans to send more, given the temperature's dropping?

And then on just the operational update, how would you describe the current status of fighting, you know, around the Dnieper River? Is it kind of at a -- a stalemate? Are you seeing still a lot of firepower? Can you give us any sort of sense of how many fighters, both Russian and Ukrainian, are amassed there?

Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. I'll take the first couple, and then -- to see if our senior military official would like to take the third.

In terms of the equipment that I just mentioned, most of that is not yet in Ukraine. We just announced it on Wednesday of last week. But with drawdown equipment, typically it's a matter of days or weeks before it arrives in country because we're just pulling it from our stocks and then, you know, immediately delivering it. So I would anticipate soon -- that it will soon be delivered.

The generators specifically, these generators were -- they're relatively small generators that we knew that the Ukrainians could use compatible with their power system. So you know, although we will continue to look for additional capability, I would not expect that we will have a lot more internal to our own supplies. But it's important to put this in context because this is just assistance for the Ukrainian Armed Forces specifically from the Defense Department. And you know, as we speak, my civilian counterparts in civilian agencies of the U.S. government are working actually, with European allies and global partners to support the Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Tara, in terms of what we're seeing along the Dnieper River, so as I mentioned, you know, the Russians have moved to the east side of the Dnieper River and are continuing to shell across the river into the Kherson oblast. I think it's fair to say there are, you know, several thousand from both sides. There's generally some parity in that portion of the battlespace in terms of numbers of Russians and numbers of Ukrainians. Both have placed the river. As you know, the -- the Russians blew the bridges as they were crossing back to the other side to prevent Ukrainian pursuit across those bridges. �Stalemate" may not be the right term. I don't think I would call it a stalemate. I would just say that, you know, that's a pretty sizable obstacle between the two. And as I mentioned, the Ukrainians are pretty busy demining and trying to pick up the pieces from what the Russians did to the land and to the area on the other side of the river.

...

Q: Yes, so on air defenses, there's still talk about possibly providing a Patriot system to Ukraine, maybe from one of the European countries. Can you address that? And also, you know, we've long asked about possibility of providing aircraft to Ukraine; also, longer-range artillery, if you could address that, as well.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So Tom, I would say that on air defense, this is our top priority, and we are looking at all the possible capabilities that could help the Ukrainians withstand Russian attacks.

So, you know, all of the capabilities are on the table and we are looking at what the United States can do, we're looking at what our allies and partners can do, and, you know, looking at combinations of capabilities that would be useful.

I think it is important, you know, to note that just in the past couple months, there have been a number of offers of support for air defense. You know, we've heard great things about the IRIST system that Germany contributed. Spain, in addition to the Hawk I mentioned, has contributed the Aspide system. France has committed the Crotale system. And again, additional Hawk launchers on the way.

So we're looking at all these combinations of equipment, even as we look at additional capability that we can provide. I hope that's helpful.

Oh, and that applies, as well, to -- you asked about Tac Air, and, you know, that's the same discussion that we've had previously on this, where we certainly are considering, you know, all the possible, you know, capabilities that will be useful for the Ukrainian future force, but from an aviation perspective, we do see that as a longer term capability need, whereas air defense is an immediate priority for us.

Q: Well, can you say specifically if Patriots are on the table?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I'm just going to say that all capabilities are on the table.

Q: Including Patriots?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Patriot is one of the air defense capabilities that is being considered --

(CROSSTALK)

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: -- all others.

Q: Great. Thanks.

...
Q: Hey, guys. Thank you.

Can you update at all on North Korean artillery deliveries? Obviously we've talked about that in the past, but as far as I can tell, we haven't had any kind of update on that in -- in the last few weeks.

And (inaudible), can I ask about artillery use on the battlefield? There -- there's been a lot of discussion about the Ukrainians firing 4 to 7,000, the Russians firing two or three times that each day, and -- and both sides worried about the numbers in their own inventories. What numbers are we seeing today, in terms of actual artillery shells flying? And -- and is there a concern on -- on our side about getting Ukraine enough of those?

Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Nick, on North Korea, you know, I'm not sure there's a lot of really new information. In September, we know that the DPRK, you know, publicly denied that it's providing ammunition to Russia, but we do have information that they are covertly supplying Russia's war in Ukraine with artillery shells and we know that DPRK is trying to obfuscate the real destination of their arms shipments by trying to make it appear as though they're being sent to countries in the Middle East or North Africa.

But, you know, we're monitoring this, we're monitoring for deliveries, but I don't have any additional, new information for you on that.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hey, Nick, on -- on artillery employment -- so first of all, from the very beginning of the conflict, this has been in some cases, an artillery duel. And as you rightly stated, I mean, the Russian ability to outpace the Ukrainians in artillery is nothing new. So in fact, what I would tell you is that has decreased over time, in terms of the ratio at which the Russians have been able to out-shoot the Ukrainians.

We assess part of that is probably due to Russian munition numbers. It's also due in, you know, part to the Ukrainian effectiveness with the employment of their artillery and some of their systems. So, you know, the ability of the Ukrainians to identify Russian artillery systems and Russian radars has been pretty effective, and they've been combining the use of not just their tube artillery, but as you know, the HIMARS and the employment of GMLRS to get after the Russian artillery effectiveness. So I guess what I'm saying is there are a lot of pieces to this.

And then the other piece would be there are a lot of types of artillery. So, you know, there's a lot of time spent on 155 because, you know, we provided a bunch of 155 howitzers, as you know, as did a bunch of our allies and partners.

But there are also 105s, there are also 152s, 122s, and the stockpiles of those munitions, depending on the type, varies. We certainly are -- you know, we keep an eye on this and our Ukrainian partners talk to us clearly about their employment.

...

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Right, and Courtney, to answer your question about clarifying the consideration of tac air and the consideration of air defense, I'm going to go back to something that I know I've discussed with this group before. In terms of fighter aircraft, when we think about that as a future capability area for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to invest in, we have to think about the sustainment and maintenance and training that all go along with having, you know, a tac air fleet. And so that's where it really isn't something that is an immediate priority for us as we consider the Ukrainian Armed Forces' capability needs.

But I contrast that with ground-based integrated air defense systems which are an immediate need. And I don't want to say that there is, you know, a lack of training and maintenance requirements because certainly there are, and we will have to consider training. We're providing training on a number of air defense systems, along with our allies right now, the systems I mentioned earlier. So there is training required, but it's not on the same scale. And similarly, the maintenance is not on the same scale. So we feel that by providing air defense capability in the near term, we will be able to help the Ukrainians with some near-term needs.

Now, I also want to clarify that that doesn't mean that we wouldn't have longer-term investments, because as we have found and as you've seen with our USAI investments, there's certain capabilities that we can provide quickly if they're from drawdown, or in other words, they're coming from U.S. stocks, or if we can contract something that is already available from industry. But in other cases, we have to invest in procurement that takes time, and that's where you see we've provided an initial set of NASAMS that are fielded today and that are helping protect Ukrainians as we speak. But we also have additional NASAMS that will be arriving down the road. So similarly, there may be a mix of air defense capabilities that we can provide very soon, and others that we can provide down the road, and we really are looking at all possible capabilities. I hope that helps.

...

Q: Thanks.

Question about the number the weaponization of winter that you mentioned in your opening remarks. This is being undertaken with precision-guided missiles that Russia still has. Do you see those numbers dwindling even further, or are they coming up on a reserve that you weren't aware of? And what about these reports that they're digging into cruise missiles that were designed to carry nuclear weapons, where they've removed the nuclear weapons and replaced them with ballast so that those can then be launched at targets inertly, and therefore, take away some of the air defense capability that Ukraine has?

Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think on this, you know, we are watching Russia continue to double down on its strategy to try to, you know, inflict pain on the Ukrainian people to try to break their will. Obviously, they're not succeeding. We do not believe that they will succeed, but they continue to draw on what stocks they have. I don't have, you know, any specific data for you on, you know, Russian available missile stocks. But I will say that I do expect that they will continue to employ this tactic.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, I would just kind of echo (inaudible) comment. I mean, it's certainly something that they're trying to do to mitigate the effects of the air defense systems that the Ukrainians are employing to a pretty good -- decent effect.

...

Q: Hey there. Thanks.

A lot of pressure, the last question. Real quick, though, I was hoping you could first go back -- the errant missile that landed in Poland, how long did it take you all for the Senior Military Official to determine that this was not a Russian missile? Was it pretty clear right away to you all?

And secondly, to the Senior Defense Official, if you could bring us up to speed on the investigation, how many Americans are there, if the investigation's over now, and what conclusions you might be able to share?

Thanks.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Phil, that's a nice job on the last question. I don't know why you were nervous about that. Yeah, I wish you'd asked something different. I'm just kidding.

Hey, on the errant missile, I don't know how quickly we had one way or the other. We had -- you know, like everyone else, we try not to jump to conclusions and make an immediate assessment of what had occurred. We did try to look at the facts involved.

As you know, we have the ability to see a lot of things. We had a decent indication that there was a possibility it was a Ukrainian-fired air defense system not meant to go into Poland. And so, you know, walking into that, I think we were able to provide senior leaders an understanding of -- of where we were.

But this is just as an American, not as a Senior Military Official I thought that the approach was really well balanced. I didn't think folks jumped to conclusions, I thought they weighed it.

And then the other piece is this is a Polish investigation. And so, you know, we -- like many other countries, are, you know, leaning forward to provide expertise where it's needed as we press forward.

And so we'll wait to see any final results from the Poles but I do think that, you know, a number of folks reached decent conclusions as this went along.

Q: So pretty much right away, minutes then? Like, that was a -- it was a -- it was a pretty fast determination, correct?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, I -- I don't have any more -- anything more on that one, Phil. Yeah, I -- again, I don't have a lot of timings on that.

# ¿ Nov 30, 2022 05:51

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

OddObserver posted:

I hate that loving word. Massive warcrimes, widespread torture: no big deal.

I�d consider dozens of nations providing financial and direct material military aid to Ukraine and major sanctions against Russia to be a latge response to a big deal.

# ¿ Nov 30, 2022 14:36

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Dwesa posted:

Shaykovka air base was attacked by kamikaze drone, destroying two bombers.

This has never been confirmed as a thing that really happened.

# ¿ Nov 30, 2022 14:47

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Eric Cantonese posted:

They�re still using TU-22s? I thought those were, like, B-58 Hustler equivalents.

The B-58 was already retired before the first production TU-22M flew.

The most common TU-22 model didn't enter service until either late 80s or early 90s.

# ¿ Dec 6, 2022 02:20

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

ChubbyChecker posted:

syria and egypt haven't been high tech countries since the middle ages

This is so very wrong in a specific direction.

# ¿ Dec 6, 2022 04:45

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Charlz Guybon posted:

Soviets flew jets in the Korea War. No one cared

The top US general recommended nuclear war over Korea and criticized civil control of the military. Thankfully, he was fired. Despite that, he was massively popular and welcomed by most of the public as a hero upon his relief.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 06:46

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Randarkman posted:

The Soviet jets weren't really what had Mac going all nukey, it was the Chinese intervention.

I would still argue we cared A Lot in that it confirmed the biases of guys thinking up domino theory, containment, or more hawkish theories that we had to fight communism every single place. It was a reality of the wars that weapons were shipped, but it helped form decades of policy.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 16:00

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

cr0y posted:

How do patriots compare to S300s?

For cruise missile defense probably good enough to say they can both do point defense. They do not speak the same software language.

It depends on the build. Patriot has existed since the 80s, but modern Patriot today is very different. Greece has some very old Patriot systems, whereas the US has been continually designing and fielding new builds of Patriot.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 16:15

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Baconroll posted:

In the 1st Gulf War some Soviet instructors who had been assisting the Iraqis were captured, and very quietly handed over to a Soviet embassy. No fuss or press.

Whereas in 2003, the US made a public stink about Russia selling ATGMs and jammers to Iraq.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 18:14

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Warbadger posted:

So, what did the US do about it?

Bitched and moaned and then implemented economic sanctions.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 18:54

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

I was making the point that it is not true that Russia complains about weapons proliferation, but the US �doesn�t care� when adversaries proliferate weapons.

# ¿ Dec 15, 2022 18:57

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

evil_bunnY posted:

What's S-300's mobility like? Everyone I've heard talk about patriot said it'd a complete rear end in a top hat to move about.

They�re similar. To pass the �intermediate� US requirements to certify a patriot crew, the patriot battery crews have to be able to pack up the system in 45 minutes and emplace the site in an hour.

# ¿ Dec 16, 2022 14:02

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Telsa Cola posted:

My understanding was that yeah, If the situation is at the point where you are stationary enough that they are feasible then they are pretty solid because of the above mentioned reasons.

Even when you are on the move a bit, while a cable won�t talk vehicle to vehicle, it�s seriously fast and easy to set up a basic cable comm line. A bit more tome and education for one with proper phone numbers and switchboards. But to run a line to the commander�s sleeping point or to run a line between two fighting positions is basically the time it takes to jog that far plus about 1 minute, so it�s very fast and easy to set up and tear down at short halts or doing recon or pulling security.

# ¿ Dec 20, 2022 00:46

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

mobby_6kl posted:

Ahh loving finally. Maybe the important part of the JDAM announcement is the implication? I.e. it's JDAM... and F-16s from which to drop them.

Bold prediction: It will not be from F-16s anytime in 2023.

The singular patriot battery reads like a proof of concept to see how training and maintenance goes before committing to more.

# ¿ Dec 21, 2022 17:56

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Also, one Patriot battery (or 20 of them) wouldn�t just neutralize the Russian air component.

# ¿ Dec 21, 2022 20:11

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Charliegrs posted:

The tank rounds and Grad rockets are interesting. I'm assuming the tank rounds are for the Soviet/Russian tanks the Ukrainians use and Grads are a Russian designed system as well. I don't think the US produces any of these? I wonder where they are getting them from.

USAI funding goes through contracting. So the USG may not even know where they are coming from yet or when.

# ¿ Dec 21, 2022 22:25

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Kraftwerk posted:

So I'm assuming this is where international arms dealers who normally operate illegally and draw the ire of interpol get protection from the US govt in exchange for using their network and connections to arm Ukraine.

I meant more that it might just be paying someone to build new ones, not international weapons smuggling.

# ¿ Dec 22, 2022 00:49

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

1st AD posted:

Patriot batteries

There�s really no such thing as an excess Patriot battery. One of the reasons the decision to give Ukraine one Patriot battery was a big deal.

# ¿ Dec 22, 2022 16:43

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...round-briefing/
SDO and SMO brief from 21 December.

List of PDA and USAI announced:
PDA - drawn from US stocks, usually much faster aside from train-up time. USAI - US goes to indsutry to contract for sourcing. Months to years lead time.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3252782/185-billion-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/

Intro then excerpts as I decide. I cut a lot of repeated or reworded question: When will Patriot be operational? How will the JDAM kits be used (ordnance/carrier)?

Highlights:
-One (1) Patriot Battery will be delivered to Ukraine, drawn from US stocks. There isn't such a thing as "excess" Patriot, so it is a pretty significant announcement on the US end. As for Ukraine, it's one more medium-range SAM battery. It's not clear how much that actually buys you in defending such a wide area and as many critical assets as Ukraine has to contend with, but every bit will help, especially as S-300 interceptor stores run down over time. DOD will not comment on ordnance quantities or where that is coming from, other than existing US stocks.
-US expects training Ukrainians on Patriot to take "several months," so I wouldn't expect to see this in operation in Ukraine until spring of 2023, at the absolute earliest.
-USAI funding for satellite comms and terminals (might or might not be a response to the StarLink fickleness about offering services to Ukraine for free)
-US not commenting on means of JDAM kit employment for OPSEC reasons
-For purchase of legacy Soviet / Russian caliber ammunition (122mm artillery, 152mm artillery, 122mm Grad rockets, 125mm tank rounds), comments sound like it will leverage (primarily?) already produced rounds from around the world to be shipped to Ukraine on the US's dime. It could also include new production, not clear.
-Is there some ability to tie together all the US and legacy systems? Nope, people are looking into that, but anything resembling interoperability / integration will likely be procedural and tactics / agreements-based, not a technical solution in the mid to longer term.
-The Ukrainian Patriot battery will not be linked into any NATO systems or communications. It is a battery for Ukraine to operate, on their own.

quote:

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, everyone. I'd like to start by just recognizing where we are in this war. We're in over 300 days after Russia launched this war to try to stamp out Ukraine's existence as a free nation. And at this moment, we are welcoming President Zelenskyy to Washington, D.C., a sign of Ukraine's determination, its spirit, its resolve, and an opportunity for us to be able to reinforce our support for Ukraine during President Zelenskyy's visit.

So you will hear more from the White House later this afternoon about President Zelenskyy's visit. In the meantime, what I wanted to do is give you some important details about our new security assistance commitments that President Biden announced today, totaling $1.85 billion.

Now, these -- these commitments come in two parts, and we're announcing both of these together. First, we have a presidential drawdown package that's valued at $1 billion. This is the 28th such drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories for Ukraine since August of 2021. And then the second is an additional $850 million in commitments under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

So first, let me talk about the presidential drawdown package, and this package includes for the first time a Patriot air defense battery and munitions. This is another signal of our long-term commitment to Ukraine's security. As you know, Patriot is one of the world's most advanced air defense systems, and it will give Ukraine a critical long-range capability to defend its airspace. It is capable of intercepting cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft.

It's important to put the Patriot battery in context. For air defense, there is no �silver bullet.� Our goal is to help Ukraine strengthen a layered, integrated approach to air defense. That will include Ukraine's own legacy capabilities, as well as NATO-standard systems. Patriot will complement a range of medium- and short-range air defense capabilities that we've provided and that allies have provided in prior donation packages, and for us, that includes NASAMS and Avenger systems. Patriot does require training, and we expect it will take several months to ensure Ukrainian forces have the training they need to employ it successfully.

Now, in addition to Patriot, this drawdown package includes several other highlights. First, it includes an additional 500 precision-guided 155-millimeter artillery rounds, and it includes several different mortar systems and rounds for those systems. Second, it includes precision aerial munitions, and then third, it includes additional MRAP vehicles and Humvees, and I think important to note, this is 38 MRAP vehicles, but we've provided 440 to date, and it's 120 Humvees, but this comes on top of 1,200 Humvees that we've provided to date.

Now for the second part of today's announcement, the $850 million under USAI, I just want to remind that this is an authority under which we procure capabilities from industry, rather than drawing them down from U.S. stocks. So USAI capabilities typically take longer to deliver. Now under USA -- AI, we are committing to provide a range of different non -- what we call nonstandard ammunitions. This is what we formerly called Soviet-type ammunition. It includes 152-millimeter artillery rounds, 122-millimeter artillery rounds, and these will be able to help the Ukrainians bring more of its legacy systems, its legacy howitzers back into the fight in greater numbers. We also plan to -- to provide 122-millimeter Grad rockets, and this is to support Ukraine's Grad rocket artillery capability, as well as tank ammunition to help Ukraine sustain operations with its existing tanks. Another capability we're providing via USAI are satellite communication terminals and services. This will add resilience to Ukraine's communications infrastructure. And then as always, we have funding from (sic) training, for maintenance and for sustainment in support of the equipment we and our partners have provided.

So this brings us to, the United States has committed more than $21.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration. And as President Biden has said, we will continue to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces for as long as it takes. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Q: Hi. Thanks a lot. One clarification, and then a question on the satellite coms. On the -- the Patriots, how quickly do you expect the -- the Patriot battery will be in country? And you said several months to train. I just want to make sure that's accurate.

And then secondly on the satellite communications, is this for the STARLINK system that's already being used there? Does this guarantee that that system would remain there for a while, or is this an effort to supplement the STARLINK system? Can you give us a bit more clarity on what that will buy, and how much money is in the USAI? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great, thanks. So on Patriot, I don't have the precise date for the system to be transferred, and obviously, we would be very careful about operational security details there. But I can tell you it is a several-month training process, and we're working through the details of the training right now. So several one -- several months is about -- about all I can give you in terms of a timeline.

And then on the SATCOM, this will augment existing Ukrainian capabilities, but since we're in the process of contract negotiations I can just say we're talking to a number of vendors, but can't be more specific than that. Thanks.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thank you. Our next question will go to NBC, Courtney Kube.

Q: Can I just ask any more clarity at all about the Patriots? So I get -- I understand several months for training, but can we say that the training is going to begin in the coming days? Is it going to be potentially weeks? And are they training on the actual -- actual Patriot that will be sent into Ukraine for use, or is -- is there -- can you say anything about whether the actual system itself is going to be -- start moving in while they're being trained elsewhere on it?

And then I have one more.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Okay, so Courtney, we're still working through some of the details on the -- the specifics of training, and I think we will have -- have more that we can, you know, share with you in the -- in the coming days, but, you know, for now, I can -- I can just say that, you know, the training will begin very soon, and again, it will take several months. And the -- the training is the -- the limiting timeframe here, that, the Ukrainians will have to complete the training in order to be able to, you know, field the system. And it's the Ukrainians who are operating the system, so that's absolutely essential.

And you had another question?

Q: Yeah, can you say how many Ukrainians will be -- will be trained on it? And the assumption is it's going to happen in Germany. Is that true?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So -- so I -- I don't have a -- a -- a specific training location to confirm for you. We're looking at a number of options. And I -- you know, I'm afraid I don't actually have the -- the -- the precise numbers of -- of Ukrainians going through the training.

...

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thank you. All right, we'll go to Eric Schmitt, New York Times.

Q: Just a question on the -- the precision aerial munitions. They're using the JDAM kits, right? And if so, are -- is the U.S. also providing the bombs, the GBUs, that go with that? And when do you expect these kits and -- and/or bombs to be going into country, into Ukraine? What kind of modifications might be necessary for the Ukrainian Air Force to use that?

And then I have one other question.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks, Eric. I don't have any more details for you on the precision aerial munitions. I'm not going to get into any more specifics for OPSEC reasons.

...

Q: Thank you, sir. If I remember from my own Army training, the Patriot battery has about 90 to 100 soldiers. I (inaudible) the analysts I've talked to have told me that it -- it -- in and of itself, the one thing a battery would offer -- a modest improvement to Ukrainian air defense capacity. Is there -- is the reason that you're only sending one battery at this point now -- was (it designed as sort of a -- a test to see how well they can operate one before you possibly send others? Maybe a full battalion?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, Mike, what I'll say is, you know, this isn't a comprehensive air defense solution or Ukraine. So, this is another step in many steps that we have pursued and that our allies and partners have pursued to get air defense capability to Ukraine. There's also the NASAM systems, the two have arrived and there's six more on the way.

Our allies have provided a range of short and medium-range air defense capabilities. So, with this one battery we will be offering a formidable capability, but we will still be working, you know, the U.S. will be working, and our allies and partners will be working to round out Ukraine's air defense capabilities.

...

Q: Hi, sorry for the delay. I was trying to unmute myself. A couple of follow-ups to Idrees' question. Is there anything stopping the Ukrainians are shooting the interceptors with something other than incoming threats? I mean, I understand it's an air defense system, but it's also -- it's also -- it's also an interceptor that could potentially be deployed for other threats. So, that's my first question.

And then, where are the Patriots going to -- where is the Patriot going to come from? Is it going to be transferred from a deployed location or from somewhere in the United States?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Okay, so I'll take a stab at this, although the Senior Military Official also touched on this earlier. You know, this is a defensive system, and the Ukrainians will use it to intercept incoming missiles or, aircraft that would pose a threat to their, their population, their military potentially. So, we expect that it will be used as this defense -- as the defensive system that it is.

The particular battery that we are providing, this is coming from U.S. stocks, but we -- we are not going to confirm the specific details of, where in the force we are obtaining this from.

...

Q: Thanks. I'm just curious since the air defense systems are being sent in different dribs and drabs, you sent the Hawks, of course, the Patriots coming, you've sent other systems. How the department is going to work and train up on integrated air defense or how you're thinking about integrating all these assets that are coming online at different times for the Ukrainians?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes, thanks, Jack. I think -- it sounds like you have a good appreciation for the complexity of this challenge. So, this is something that we are engaged with the Ukrainians on, even as we look to support them, you know, as they're -- I mean, they're still fielding their -- you know, their legacy systems, their S-300 systems and other short-range Soviet-type air defense systems.

And they are, you know, fielding them capably, very effectively. We are introducing a whole host of new systems to provide this layered array of air defense. So at the same time we are also, you know, in a conversation with them and in kind of technical consolations with them on how we can assist them to be able to manage and integrate a variety of capabilities.

Q: And just with regards to the Soviet systems you mentioned that are coming out of USAI in this package, is that an assessment the Ukrainians are -- need to move a little bit more slowly when it comes to the NATO systems? Obviously they're -- you know, still have a lot of Soviet-era artillery and other Soviet-era systems they're using.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. On that we want to enable the Ukrainians to bring all the firepower to the fight that they can. And so, they have a lot of legacy Soviet-type artillery systems, but they were running out of ammunition. So we'd like to enable them to be able to continue to use those systems even as they continue to use the M777 howitzers that we've provided, the HIMARS and other NATO-compatible systems. We don't see it as an �either or� but rather an and.

...

Q: I'm sorry. Excuse me. I'm sorry to interrupt. I just -- I wanted an important clarification. This is Nancy from The Wall Street Journal. You said on the call that the U.S. is not provided JDAMs, but on the State Department announcement it lists JDAMs. It says explicitly. Can you please clarify?

STAFF: Yes. We'll have to take a look at that, Nancy. Again, for operation security reasons we're not going to be able to go into any more details in terms of what the precision aerial munitions capability consists of.

Q: Wait. I'm not looking for more details. I'm looking for clarification to the details you've provided. The State Department briefing says it also marks our first transfer of joint threat attack munitions, and on this call you said you're not providing that. It's an important point. A lot of stories have gone out. I'd just like to point -- I'd like to clarify just with this as quickly as possible. I'm not looking for just different information. I'm looking to understand what is provided.

STAFF: Yes. Thank you, Nancy. We'll get a clarification.* And again, just to highlight in terms of what the DOD put out on its release is what the senior defense official was saying, is that that's what we read out. [Editor's Comment from DOD: * ED NOTE: Today�s DOD press release regarding Ukraine Security Assistance included a reference to Precision Aerial Munitions. To be more specific and to clarify comments made during this DOD-hosted background briefing, this refers specifically to Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) capability. For reporting purposes, you may attribute this additional detail to a senior military official.]

...

Q: Yes. Also wondering if we can get a little bit more detail about the USAI. In terms of will it go through the same process in terms of delivery? You said it might be delivered sort of later in the month in term -- or later in the time delivery because of the nature of the resourcing? So have you already been able to source all the ammunition, and is it going to go through the same organization group within EUCOM to get into the front lines for the Ukrainians?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. Thanks. So with USAI, I mean, the way -- the way that we're procuring this ammunition isn't really that fundamentally different from how we procure other capabilities in USAI. And, you know, as we're making the announcement we are starting that process of contracting and procuring.

And so, it usually -- I mean, one of the biggest variables for us with USAI is whether -- whether something is already produced, and we can just pick it up and deliver it, and EUCOM uses the same process to do that for USAI as it does for drawdown in terms of organizing that logistical transportation and transition to the Ukrainians or is it something that actually has to be created from scratch. And, you know, so with some higher tech capability, some of the counter-UAS capabilities, for instance. It does take -- it does take quite a bit longer because industry is actually producing.

In this case, the ammunition is a fairly straight-forward process, but each particular kind has a sort of different timeline depending on the specific vendor.

STAFF: Thank you.

Q: Thanks, and one more -- one more quick question. In terms of the response for delivering your announcement, you know, Russia six days ago warned of the consequences for U.S. sending Patriot missiles. Did that all affect the announcement? Did that all affect the amount or number? Instead of a withdrawal are you guys further into the war?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, at this point, we're -- we're quite used to heated and threatening rhetoric from Moscow. What I can tell you on this capability is it is a -- a defensive capability, and I can just assert that, you know, once again, we will continue to support the Ukrainians with what they need, when they need it, never mind the rhetoric.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thank you. We've got time for just a couple more. Let's go to Jeff Schogol, Task & Purpose.

Q: Thank you. I -- I apologize for the -- the novice question on the USAI funding, but if I heard you right, this is for 152, 122, and possibly 125 millimeter shells. Is it possible that American companies, like General Dynamics, could be producing Soviet caliber munitions?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, it -- it -- Jeff, no problem with the question. So we -- we source USAI from all around the world. I don't actually have the specific vendor information for, you know, these -- these exact rounds but -- but we source from -- you know, from -- from anywhere that we can find good supply.

...

Q: This is Jeff with Task & Purpose. We have a question from another reporter who asked if the NATO Patriot system will -- if the Patriot system will be linked to NATO systems to enhance its tracking capability. Can the Senior Defense Official answer that real quickly?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So this is a Patriot system for Ukraine to operate on its own.

Q: So no?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Okay.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes, this is not a NATO -- this is not a NATO-operated system. This is a Ukraine-operated system.

Q: Thank you.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Okay, thanks very much, everybody. Appreciate your time and thank you for joining us today. Take care.

1st AD posted:

They�re used for different purposes and their designs reflect the doctrinal differences between the USA and Russian militaries - not sure a comparison is useful.

I think it's fair to compare them in general, as long as someone recognizes that while S-300 was fielded in the late 70s and 80s (Patriot was fielded in the 80s), Patriot has gone through constant evolutionary upgrades, and Ukraine still has 80s-era S-300. Their mission sets are pretty similar, and their mobility is pretty similar.

# ¿ Dec 22, 2022 19:07

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

OddObserver posted:

Where "similar" means "both have a number of variants with different missions each", if I understood correctly.

I don't know what you mean, or which systems/variants you are referencing? Patriot versions different from one another? Patriot different from S-300?

# ¿ Dec 22, 2022 19:32

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ¿ May 12, 2024 18:20

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Moon Slayer posted:

And if you believe that, I've got a bridge from Russia to illegally occupied Crimea to sell you.

I think you are very wrong about this for both technical and policy reasons.

# ¿ Dec 22, 2022 19:55

The Something Awful Forums > Archives > Comedy Goldmine > The Goodmine > War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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