Ukraine: The straw that broke the camel's blyat

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > Ukraine: The straw that broke the camel's blyat

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

ASAPI posted:

I was just going to post the same: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/chernobyl-power-plant-captured-by-russian-forces-ukrainian-official-2022-02-24/

Someone educate me, I was under the assumption that the plant, while partially functional, shouldn't be seeing active "fighting" due to all the spicy air about. Other than being able to turn off the lights in some areas, what is the importance of this plant strategically?

Everything so far seems like Putin wants all of Ukraine, not just those two regions.

As mentioned, power infrastructure, plus there are two significant bridges at Pripyat and ChNPP (AFAIK the next ones downstream are in Kyiv proper), and the Russians apparently had a backup pontoon bridge set up on the Belarus side of the Exclusion Zone if the Ukrainians blew up the other two.

Botton line if you're traveling overland from Belarus to Kyiv then you're going to have to pass by the Chernobyl NPP.

# ¿ Feb 24, 2022 19:28

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# ¿ May 16, 2024 05:16

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

gently caress Schroeder

https://mobile.twitter.com/noahbarkin/status/1496858172040130567

# ¿ Feb 24, 2022 19:37

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Some possible supporting evidence that Ukraine was able to retake Gostomel and close the air bridge. There were reports of an additional wave of VDV taking off from Pskov and Ivanovo earlier, if they're landing in Belarus instead then that means they're going to have to transfer to helicopter or otherwise move overland with the rest of the Belarus force to reach Kyiv vs directly reinforcing the troops holding Gostomel.

https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1496970556201218053?cxt=HHwWisC9mcSyp8YpAAAA

Hopefully they really were able to retake the airport, it's not something that will win the war but it will definitely set back the Russian at least a few days in surrounding or capturing the capital. On the flip side, if the Russians are encountering setbacks then we may see them start to take the gloves off - and so far this has been remarkably restrained by Russian military standards.

# ¿ Feb 24, 2022 23:59

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

ThisIsJohnWayne posted:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3iA5KCa16s
30s in

Our Lady of FAF, hallowed be her aim.

https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1496961469665230848?cxt=HHwWgIC-ndCho8YpAAAA

# ¿ Feb 25, 2022 00:16

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Milo and POTUS posted:

What's the you know whats

Where you see Stratotankers up there are almost certainly fighters that aren't transmitting on combat air patrol.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 14:05

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Looks like Russia's having some social media issues:

https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1497523148362862593

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 14:14

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Pretty good commentary on how long standing Russian military flaws are manifesting - a couple main ones being:

- BTGs lacking the necessary intel / recon / C2 to operate effectively, leverage their artillery assets, or coordinate with CAS
- Russia committing far more BTGs than their logistics could realistically support
- Operating large number of 'full strength' BTGs means that core experienced cadres that would normally be hand-picked in smaller ops are diluted by recruits, reservists, and straight up non-existent 'ghost' soldiers who don't exist outside of the payroll
- Units getting further diluted into penny packets as they try to rush and bypass UA units leaving them open to ambush
- Trying to operate airborne CAS from field deployments in Belarus vs bases that could handle higher ops tempos

https://twitter.com/delfoo/status/1497498201527521281

quote:

1/I am going to try to explain the irrational Russian Armed Forces behavior towards strategy, common thought, or even the chances repatriated SSO that are now POW try to murder a bunch of men with stars.

2/Here's where I will start from. The Russian armed forces have never attempted anything like this. This isn't about what kind of war they're fighting it's about what they're capable of mustering.

3/Secondly it seems the decision making structrues have low opinion in general of Ukraine and their fighting abilities and sort of an ideal that there's a willing subservience in Ukranians if they get to be part of Russia. Pure racism informing their decision making process.

4/Thirdly battalion tactical groups are terrible units to support operations. They have overload the commander lack support and might not properly integrate with air or do adeqaute scouting as signals and recon are missing along with liasons with them.

5/Fourthly without standing down even if parts of the UA Nat Guard, Police, Border Guard, Territorials and Army are defeated, UA regional commands can be autonomous for days and are vast structures, short of ordering their demobilization their removal is way too costly for RuMoD.

6/And there's a lot of hidden corruption and misreporting that gets baked in into calculations but the higher you go up the chain as in a corporation, the more dimissive management is that it will be an issue. AKA Putin doesn't even remotely grasp how bad it is.

7/Based on those 5 let me try to explain the situation now. Russian units aren't stopping fire or limiting use of their kalibrs and stand off strikes. This is all they could muster south. Kalibrs are limited by launch tubes, a bit over a hundred is what they had ready.

8/We saw constant trains and movement over time moving Ru equipment and lots of aircraft being moved over to mustering points and at the end people. By then the supply was at its limit just keeping them warm and fed. They found out the hard way this was their logistical limit.

9/What people sa wasn't that troops packed spare tanks for long drives. They were carying their fuel reserves on them. The few organic refueling trucks were not enough to make up an actual reserve or depot. They had one full compliment, some spares in one truck , thats it.

10/This didn't seem that crazy in the Kremlin because the prevailing thought in the higher echelons and Putin's inner circle and the FSB was one highly dismissive of Ukraine highly hyped up by Russian army propaganda reporting. They missed that they were buying their own bullshit

11/The release of the information paralyzed them in terms of decision making. But the inherent bias remained and UA delayed mobilising so it didn't dissuade them. For 7 days they ate away supplies rather than actively trying to build them further, they were waiting a go order.

12/The limited supply meant it had to be a mad dash. BTGs were split into smaller sub units traveling on multiple roads to avoid congestion. When they met something they'd wait to coalesce or get into a fight. If the UA was suprised it would work.

13/Were the Ru troops quality ones they'd do better with just surprise on their side. But they were mostly poorly trained as full units were never called up before. Usually a brigade would send only a company and could hand pick.

14/Now it's either confess the lies about readiness or be creative. Because the corruption had created such a rot, brigade commandes chose "creative" (criminal), conscripts were added to the build up. Ghosts soldiers on the roster were hidden. That meant BTGs were far greener.

15/When these hit a city or made contact they'd deploy in unideal formations of platoon to company size. Not their fault all that much, this is what they knew. Then if a UA unit knew in advance where they were and was careful, it would anihilate the BTG splinter formation.

16/Because the timetable had to be kept, supplies were already short with the delay Ru troops would go a step further. They'd keep one sub unit to block and redirect subsequent units, the rest would continue on parallel roads. Again timetable meant usually more major roads.

17/After a couple of road blocks, BTG'd be diluted, lost a bunch of units and fighting to standstill. You'd expect that there would be air or artiller support. But BTGs aren't suited for that, when they move in chunks in parallel the artillery spotters could be in another group.

18/As we said also there was a problem stocking supplies but still CAS should probably not be as limited? Yes but Russian SSO more used to directing it had other tasks and Russia doesn't have a platform like the US surveilance planes and drones that can operate in contested air.

19/And the air was contested because of the limited early strikes due to the small build up + limited recon of where UA AF & AD were prior to this. Satelites take pics at known times, moving equipment often can dissuede strikes as it's uncertain anything will be in place.

20/What then was struck were major stationary objects, depots in main areas, radars, major command and control but again limited by number of reloads. So then Ru MoD started rolling the columns with heavy support of helicopters and planes ahead.

21/This works on day 1 when you know where your guys start & can track where they are easily and you know beyond that point it's all enemy. Once you land and refuel, it's less easy especially because as we mentioned, a BTG splitinter lacks a signals unit, just has a few officers.

22/Then comes the air asault. Becuase you have to be quick you also have to do risky stuff. The problem of course is that because your helicopters are parked in fields, ready for one load with some trucks and one set of ammo, you can do it once a day with each group.

23/That's why you wait till the end of the assualt attempt to see if it works. If you have to refuel and prep for a second go, your trucks have to go to a depot and reload and then come back. And only then try again.

24/You still have to try to take the airport fast and get guys in because if the operation takes too long and you haven't kept them(the UA) on the back foot your green troops are still moving piecemeal on roads, don't have much with them, any small village could be their end.

25/So the air assault fails, part of the pincer moves fail, you can't budge most of the UA troops what do you do? You go for broke, hope you win the race between entrechment in Kyiv and you just throwing all you have and hope if you decapitate UA, regional commands lose faith.

26/Otherwise becuase what remains of your force is split in small groups moving on main roads UA can mobilize move via back roads and just recapture most of the towns as you have few troops for actual 24/7 duties and to even spot them moving back into the town.

27/Can it work? I don't know. Is it a good plan. Hell no. Could they execute anything else, without the entire structure confessing the army has corruption,which yes the boss expected, but it's such a rot it might cost him his throne, yeah not when he's in this mood.

28/ So the spineless bunch decided to throw away 18-19 year old conscripts and veterans and pray they get lucky. Also that Putin hasn't noticed how nuts this is shows that he's either delusional or is completely inept when it comes to military affairs.

PS/ A lot of the commentary prior missed the readiness of the Russian forces and the poor state of affairs. Overreliance on official statements and major military pages missed tons of low level testimonials and regional investigative pieces on how big the rot was.

PPS/ Aggregation of Zvezda and VK mil informing pages and MAKS show sales pitches should be tempered by what we can find on the ground and regional and smaller outlets, forums and blogs were servicemembers were pissed were abundant to the point they shouldn't have been dismissed.

PPPS/ We saw lots of evidence for that and even then a part of the community of analysts dismissed it assuming once it's about having a war footing RU structures will take it serious. But that's not how bad habits work.

PPPPS/ And in the minds of the Kremlin they have been continuously on a war footing. So if during that time they left arms companies bankrupt sometimes even more than once, the habit was not going to break most likely.
To quote Nemtsov here:
<<Он ёбнутый... чтоб вы поняли?>>

And huge thanks to @ain92ru
who knows a lot more than me about this but due to the situation in Russia has posted a lot less.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 14:52

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Holy poo poo :stare:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreux_Convention_Regarding_the_Regime_of_the_Straits

That's even bigger than cutting off Russia from SWIFT - just one giant gently caress you to Russia's eternal quest for warm water ports, particularly with them potentially attempting to grab Odesa and the other remaining Ukrainian ports.

I'm sure NATO is having some extra emergency discussions now that Erdogan has thrown that gauntlet down.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 15:13

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Tomn posted:

Hi guys, civilian here, got a question about something and I hope this is OK to ask here.

There's this guy on C-SPAM posting up a bunch of documents about Russian logistics, but he's not explaining them much and I'm getting a slight headache trying to make sense of them. Can anyone break down what this is all saying in simple dummy terms, and what implications it might have, if any, for Russian forces in Ukraine? Also is any of this even relevant in wartime, given that I assume it's describing best-case "everything goes as planned" logistics?

At least one way to read it:

- Soviet Union had a large, multi-organizational logistics organization focused on mobilizing the entire economy towards supporting military operations. The Russian Federation understandably downscaled and consolidated after the Cold War since they're no longer trying to do Seven Days to the Rhine against NATO.
- The Russians briefly attempted to outsource their battlefield maintenance to contractors (e.g. like how Lockheed or Halliburton might have support personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan to support US equipment in the field). Didn't work out, so Russia switched to having military personnel provide all maintenance & logistics in the field while contractors provide support at the far rear depot level.
- In order to address the shortcomings of an all conscript army, Russia has gone to a 'contract based' approach to sign up volunteer troops for a specific length of time based on 'contracts', somewhat similar to how the US has military personnel sign on for specific tours of duty. Idea is it allows for recruitment and retention of more skilled and motivated troops than you'd get through conscription. However, the report points out that most of these contract troops are funneled towards 'trigger puller' or combat roles. This means the 'military personnel provide all maintenance & logistics in the field' mentioned earlier is still relying more on conscripts while at the same time Russia is acquiring more high tech weapons systems which require more complex logistics to operate.
- Russia historically and currently relies primarily on their railroad network for logistics, and have a dedicated military branch to maintaining the railways. This works pretty well to move units and supplies around inside of Russia, but necessarily does not extend outside of Russia's borders.
- When going on the offensive, Russia's set up a push system of logistics that just funnels material from the top down to the individual units. This is a simpler approach than trying to have units in combat request specific replacements and get them delivered, and leverages the fact that Russia has a ton of vehicles and equipment sitting in armories already. The logistics pipeline is supposed to just keep pushing out bullets, fuel, new tanks, etc with adjustments made for how hard the fighting is on a particular axis. This also explains why the Russian army might just leave disabled vehicles on the side of the road (for the time being) rather than bother fixing or recovering them during combat ops - there's an almost endless supply of tanks and APCs back at the depot so just keep sending more. The big caveat is whether the rail network can deliver the logistics from the rear depots, and in the case of offensive operations that there's enough trucks etc to carry it all out past the end of the railroad on the Russian border to where the fighting is happening. Right now this is running into a ton of issues in real time as Russia tries to push over the border into Ukraine, but in the long run it's possible things settle out a bit if/when the front line settles down and Russian logistics can catch up and disentangle itself. That's assuming Russia can politically and diplomatically continue combat ops in Ukraine indefinitely.
- There's additional details for how the individual battalion level combat units are supposed to receive and manage their resources based on Russian doctrine and organization. This is very much 'on paper' versus as-executed, and we're seeing the disconnects between the two in real time.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 16:38

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Naked Bear posted:

I think it was already pointed out earlier, but yes, Russia has this stuff stacked deep in their reserves. Whether or not they can actually move fresh materiel to the front and quickly enough to replace losses is another question, and it's looking like the answer to that question is closer to "no" than to "yes."

The one major exception being stuff like precision guided munitions. Russia has very limited reserves of high tech weapons like those, although to be fair most of NATO has similar shortcoming - see the UK and France blowing through their stocks in a few days of bombing Libya.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 17:06

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Hyrax Attack! posted:

Wonder if Ukraine has bagged a general yet. With the level of bungling so far seems inevitable.

If Ukraine doesn't then Putin probably will.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 19:32

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Comrade Blyatlov posted:

has the ukraine invasion displaced brexit as the biggest self-own globally yet?

It's been iffy with Northern Ireland but Putin's not one to settle for second place.

# ¿ Feb 26, 2022 23:20

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Radical 90s Wizard posted:

If you wanna check out the Russian propaganda side of this, check out the C-Spam thread, it's like stepping into another dimension

This guy sums up that line of discussion better than I can.

https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1496834220865757185

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 01:49

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

BBC Russia apparently got their hands on voice mails between Kadyrov and subordinates detailing pre-invasion preparation:

https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1497632971548856322

https://www-bbc-com.translate.goog/russian/features-60528746?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

quote:

A few days later, "Martynov" says that he had just "completed work in Smolensk", where he reported on all the "moments" that await his unit when it crosses the border.

"One hundred percent of all the actions that we will do there, they are approved and supported by the leadership. Today I reported in detail how our units will act when repelling an attack if we fall into an ambush [...]. I reported on the work itself in a separate block in the city. We ourselves arranged where we would enter, which buildings, what to take under control. "

From Smolensk, "Martynov" said, he is heading to Bryansk, where "it is planned to hold an extended meeting with the commanders." Separately, he assured the "boss" that he did not tell anyone anything, and the official version, which he voiced to his subordinates, was that "Russian-Belarusian exercises have begun, by order of the chief we are participating in these exercises."

And when there are only a day left until the moment when they "enter", "Martynov" will bring all the information. Prior to that, he planned to "move to Moscow" to take "clean Ukrainian SIM cards" and "special satellite modems."

By "we" he means "subdivisions of the Chechen Republic".

quote:

Presumably a week before the Russian invasion, "Martynov" says that the purpose of the operation was finally conveyed to a wide range of commanders.

Many were struck by it, he admits.

"Today [in Smolensk] all groups have gathered, the commanders of all SOBR, OMON, military detachments of special units have gathered. Most of the commanders today heard for the first time all the tasks and goals that we face. Chief, to be honest, many commanders listened to this with bulging eyes ", barely restrained their emotions. There was a lot of talk: many commanders are worried that they will have "refuseniks" who will refuse to write a report," he said with excitement.

�Naturally, this does not concern us, we have been repeatedly set as an example today,� Martynov immediately reports.

quote:

A few days later he reports.

"Tonight, the first group, plus our advanced group, is advancing to point B, in Belarus. And we are advancing with all our staff tomorrow night."

"Kadyrov" is driving in a car, Caucasian music is playing in the background, a certain "Adam" is sitting next to him. "Adam and I are preparing, there is help," he jokes.

The laughter of Kadyrov's companion is not heard. It is known that State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov is close to Kadyrov.

�Ramzan Akhmatovich, elder brother, thanks for the help! But we hope that we will invite you when we have already set up the music, our correct one, and we will prepare dances in the Maidan or Khreshchatyk area,� �Martynov� joyfully picks up.

quote:

Presumably February 23 "Martynov" excitedly reports.

"Ramzan Akhmatovich, everything is in perfect order with us, all our construction teams are fully trained, hammers are ready, saws are ready, they took nails with them, they are fully loaded. And they are ready to perform any task in seven hours."

Under construction work and hammers with saws, perhaps, the upcoming operation and weapons are meant.

"May Allah grant that construction and construction end successfully, that they lay a solid foundation so that you can complete the construction," Kadyrov rejoices.

On the morning of February 24, Russia launched a military operation in Ukraine.

"Ready to fulfill any of your assigned tasks, any of your orders," - this is how "Martynov" ends each of his voice messages.

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 04:54

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

SquirrelyPSU posted:

This feels like a big deal?

Belarus has had a government in exile for the last 102 years so it's not like there haven't been challengers to Lukashenka's rule, but it is telling how more voices are getting louder against both him and Putin.

It looks like Russia tried going into Kharkiv this morning with unsupported infantry for some reason, doesn't seem to have turned out well for them.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1497811505806553092?cxt=HHwWiMC9gZ_opckpAAAA

https://twitter.com/IntelDoge/status/1497823963992440832?cxt=HHwWgICy3bO9q8kpAAAA

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1497843560581902338?cxt=HHwWhMC52YmytMkpAAAA

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1497858860052267011?cxt=HHwWhoCy0c-su8kpAAAA

Terrifying Effigies fucked around with this message at 14:51 on Feb 27, 2022

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 14:46

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Best map I've seen so far of the airspace closures - Russia is still able to fly into Kaliningrad through a narrow strip between Finland and Estonia but otherwise they're close to not being able to fly airlines west at all. I imagine Sweden / Denmark / the Benelux are holding off to give a chance for Russian airlines to get aircraft back to Russian territory before completely shutting the door. There's been a couple that have already had to divert up around the top of Norway to get around Finland.

edit - spoke too soon, updated map:

https://twitter.com/BNONews/status/1497883024628797442?cxt=HHwWhMCy4ZerxskpAAAA

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 14:57

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Icon Of Sin posted:

They�re ghosts. We see evidence of them and their actions, but there�s barely a single pic of any of them, anywhere.

Idk how they�re doing it, but they�re drat good at it.

My suspicion is that the UA regulars are practicing opsec re: smartphones and social media given their experiences in Donbas with Russians exploiting Ukrainian cell phones for targeting. They've learned the hard way over the past eight years that you don't run around posting Tiktoks of your sick shots when the other side has SIGINT capabilities.

edit - if you want an example of what Ukrainian mud does to armored vehicles:

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497885037324292098?cxt=HHwWhMCywaugx8kpAAAA

Terrifying Effigies fucked around with this message at 15:12 on Feb 27, 2022

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 15:08

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

AreWeDrunkYet posted:

It sounds like Russia got a bloody nose, but is this site accurate? This map makes it look like Russia is a day or two away from cutting off a large pocket in eastern Ukraine and threatening Kyiv from that direction.

https://liveuamap.com/

Wikipedia of all places has one of the more accurate and up to date maps, with the caveat that much of the 'Russian Occupied' territory outside of the Donbas is very loosely held at the moment:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#/media/File:2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

# ¿ Feb 27, 2022 19:53

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

That's, uh, quite the way to engage in negotiations with a city government.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1498955188811583492?cxt=HHwWiMC-ta3zrc0pAAAA

# ¿ Mar 2, 2022 13:12

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

With the caveat of Covid, it looks like Russia has on average about 9-10 million domestic airline passengers a month in 2021.

Looks like those passengers are going to have to catch a train instead.

https://twitter.com/janedvidek/status/1498723248183382020

I've taken an overnight train from St. Pete to Moscow once and it was pretty bleak, rattling late Soviet train cars and multiple stops in the absolute middle of nowhere with just featureless snow and pitch black pines.

# ¿ Mar 3, 2022 01:04

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

In hindsight I probably should have realized that military trucks had some way to keep their tires inflated.

Wikipedia posted:

CTIS was first used in production on the American DUKW amphibious truck, which was introduced in 1942.

Neat!

# ¿ Mar 3, 2022 03:16

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

CainFortea posted:

Is Journalist or Journalista a russian or ukrainian word for journalist? Or were they just shouting english at russians?

Google translate has 'journalist' as:

Russian
журналистка
zhurnalistka

Ukrainian
журналіст
zhurnalist

So close enough it should be obvious to anyone bothering to listen.

# ¿ Mar 5, 2022 00:03

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

KitConstantine posted:

Remember that clip of the "food and fuel trucks" from earlier?

The Russian ministry of Defense unlocked their Twitter account* so now we can see the whole video showing their extremely real logistical support in Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/mod_russia/status/1501851187783548931?t=DiCH3owLDdH01dWazkl8Xw&s=19
I've never been in the military, but ceramic plates used for presentation and flowers on tables don't seem very...practical

Also zero mud. Anywhere. I dunno guys this seems too good to be true.

*everyone who runs a Russian twitter account is the thinnest skinned mother fucker on the planet so the Russian MoD twitter account locked up for like 4 days

Also (nearly) zero soldiers.

# ¿ Mar 11, 2022 04:03

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

psydude posted:

Double posting because this is juicy:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/l...f08527b36854d05

Things are apparently going poorly enough that they're having to rely on (presumably) Syrians to backfill their ranks.

It's not a war on the steppe if you don't have minor powers holding your flanks.

# ¿ Mar 11, 2022 13:43

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Arrath posted:

I'm beginning to think that the Russian method of bridging involves filling the channel with sunk armor.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w82CqjaDKmA

# ¿ Mar 20, 2022 03:10

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Arrath posted:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61114843

Down she goes.

So that's by far the biggest warship to be sunk in combat since the Belgrano, right?

# ¿ Apr 14, 2022 22:34

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

golden bubble posted:

Russia is bringing out one of the Tsar's old ships
https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1517518693055578113

Using a Tsarist salvage ship to try and recover a piece of the True Cross / secret nuclear warheads from a sunken Soviet-era missile cruiser during an international crisis is some Dirk Pitt-rear end poo poo.

# ¿ Apr 22, 2022 19:23

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Icon Of Sin posted:

So in an environment where energy drinks and coffee flow freely, you�re eating more MREs than you�d like, you�re already likely dehydrated from the heat, and you�re getting Motrin thrown at you for whatever ails you�

I got sad and forgot my question after thinking about deployment life
��-
Is there a running tally of how many colonels or above the Ukrainians have killed? I saw one maybe a week-ish ago, but haven�t seen one since that command tent got evaporated and ~50 more officers died.

Ukraine's claiming ~10 generals killed so far, only a couple of which have been officially confirmed so far:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Russian_generals_killed_during_the_2022_invasion_of_Ukraine

# ¿ May 2, 2022 12:00

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Wibla posted:

Hawkeye

(From MASH, not the dumb modern superhero bullshit in case anyone got confused)

Also a legit answer :v:

# ¿ May 4, 2022 22:55

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

MonkeyLibFront posted:

I'm guessing engineer recce isn't a thing

Apparently it is for the UAF!

https://twitter.com/kms_d4k/status/1524506110887088128
(copied from the Cold War thread, didn't see it in the past few pages over here)

# ¿ May 13, 2022 01:15

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

A.o.D. posted:

The main takeaway from all this is that the Russian bridgehead attempt is a textbook case in a) how not to bridgehead and b) this is what happens when you do it wrong.

Somewhere in Hell Marshal Cadorna breathes a sigh of relief as his photo finally gets replaced in the textbooks.

# ¿ May 17, 2022 01:43

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Comrade Blyatlov posted:

do you mean the instant release or the time-release kind

Going by Dark, the answer is yes.

# ¿ Aug 2, 2022 00:32

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Arrath posted:

Turns out it's a lot harder to keep a lid on that kind of thing when you can't just triangulate the handful of radio sets the enemy agents are using and instead everyone has a phone in their pockets at all times.

That really got driven home in that VDV guy's recounting of the Kherson invasion where he starts to realize that every civilian from teenager to pensioner they're passing are on their phones taking pictures and sending texts.

# ¿ Aug 24, 2022 04:02

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Hyrax Attack! posted:

Lol I saw a report earlier today that Russia was sending paratroopers as apparently those are the best trained/equipped guys available. Not a good sign if those guys are surrendering.

They've been throwing the VDV into the meat grinder since Day 1 of the invasion, it's more a surprise there are any paratroopers left to surrender.

# ¿ Sep 12, 2022 22:52

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

GD_American posted:

https://twitter.com/secretnofun/status/1571127331766562823?s=46&t=b_rir1F1lSH_u_eb_ZHDIA

I think Wagner would be thrilled with pedophiles considering some of the alternatives:

https://twitter.com/callsign_santa/status/1572424074969886723

(haven't seen any substantive confirmation that this dude was enlisted, but he's certainly in the prison pool they're recruiting from)

# ¿ Sep 23, 2022 01:08

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

New Battlefield looking pretty sick

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1577775204939472903?cxt=HHwWjoCxnZCMseUrAAAA

Also goddamn can't even imagine just barreling cross country towards the enemy in a humvee like the second coming of Marshal Foch

# ¿ Oct 6, 2022 03:52

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

BIG HEADLINE posted:

the Navy's already considered suicide drones, considering their adding Bushmaster cannon to a fair number of ships.

After this clip from the attack I finally get why the US Navy is so concerned about swarm attacks, both the deck guns and helicopter struggle to take out one or two drones and it looks like it got well within the range that it could have let off a missile or torpedo if it had one.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1586420304825360386?cxt=HHwWhICp2ZW3jIQsAAAA

# ¿ Oct 30, 2022 03:40

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

The one I always remember was goons correctly calling Biden as Obama's VP pick before the networks, and proving it by getting pizza delivered to his house and watching the secret service answer the door on live CNN.

# ¿ Jan 17, 2023 04:35

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Kei Technical posted:

A novella that answers an honestly important question: how cool would a nuclear ekranoplan be?

I think you're thinking of Missile Gap (another excellent Stross Cold War scifi)

# ¿ Feb 5, 2023 03:57

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# ¿ May 16, 2024 05:16

Terrifying Effigies: Oct 22, 2008; Problems look mighty small from 150 miles up.

Pine Cone Jones posted:

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1623510800819187714?t=g2oC4jqSADypv_olAuSlrw&s=19

Had to do a quick double take that they're fighting over Sakko i Vantsetti, the 1920s Soviet Union was a wild place.

# ¿ Feb 9, 2023 12:56

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > Ukraine: The straw that broke the camel's blyat

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